Oil and Gas Law — Rent or Royalties: North Dakota Joins the Majority of States in Adopting the  At the Well  Rule for Calculating Royalties in Oil and Gas Leases by Scheel, Lindsey
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 85 
Number 4 North Dakota Energy Law: The 
Production, Conservation, and Regulation of Our 
State’s Diverse Energy Sources 
Article 9 
1-1-2009 
Oil and Gas Law — Rent or Royalties: North Dakota Joins the 
Majority of States in Adopting the "At the Well" Rule for 
Calculating Royalties in Oil and Gas Leases 
Lindsey Scheel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Scheel, Lindsey (2009) "Oil and Gas Law — Rent or Royalties: North Dakota Joins the Majority of States in 
Adopting the "At the Well" Rule for Calculating Royalties in Oil and Gas Leases," North Dakota Law Review: 
Vol. 85 : No. 4 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol85/iss4/9 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu. 
      
 
OIL AND GAS LAW—RENT OR ROYALTIES: 
NORTH DAKOTA JOINS THE MAJORITY OF STATES 
IN ADOPTING THE “AT THE WELL” RULE 
FOR CALCULATING ROYALTIES ON OIL AND GAS LEASES 
Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, 768 N.W.2d 496 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., the North Dakota Supreme Court 
expressly announced it joined the majority of states following the “at the 
well” rule for calculating royalties on oil and gas leases.  The “at the well” 
rule defines the wellhead as the appropriate point for royalty calculation; 
royalty may be calculated using the comparable sales method or the work-
back method.  Of the two methods, the comparable sales method is the 
preferred method for calculating market value.  However, when comparable 
sales evidence is not available, it is appropriate to use the workback 
method.  Following the workback method, lessees begin with the point of 
sale price received, then deduct reasonable post-production costs to arrive at 
the market value of oil or gas at the wellhead.  Thus, Petro-Hunt properly 
deducted post-production costs before calculating royalty.  In addition, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court held “free use” lease clauses allowed Petro-
Hunt to use residue gas off the leased premises to fuel the central tank 
batteries because the residue gas was used in furtherance of lease opera-
tions.  Finally, the court determined Petro-Hunt’s deductions for risk-capital 
and depreciation were not excessive.  The Bice decision brings stability to 
an unsettled area of North Dakota law, and the rule is likely to impact future 
oil and gas lease dealings in the state. 
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I. FACTS 
In 1976, Gulf Oil Corporation discovered the Little Knife Field in 
Dunn, Billings, and McKenzie Counties of North Dakota.1  During the late 
1970s, Gulf Oil Corporation built the Little Knife Gas Plant to treat the gas 
obtained from the Little Knife wells.2  A disagreement developed between 
Gulf Oil Corporation and the Little Knife royalty owners in the early 1980s 
concerning how gas should be valued for royalty purposes.3  The parties 
reached a settlement agreement in 1983.4  The agreement stated Gulf Oil 
Corporation and the royalty owners agreed gas royalties “would be deter-
mined by adding all of the sources of revenue from the sale of gas and gas 
products and subtracting from that total certain costs associated with 
 
1. Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶¶ 2, 5, 768 N.W.2d 496, 498-99. 
2. Id. ¶ 2, 768 N.W.2d at 498. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
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processing the gas.”5  In 1997, Petro-Hunt acquired the Little Knife Gas 
Plant and interests in the field.6 
The Little Knife Field produced sour gas, which was not a marketable 
product.7  Petro-Hunt pumped sour gas from the field and routed the gas to 
one of three central tank batteries.8  The batteries separated oil and water 
from the gas before sending individual streams of gas, oil, and water to the 
Little Knife Gas Plant; the plant processed the sour gas into marketable 
sweet gas.9  The sweet gas was then sold at or downstream of the plant 
tailgate.10  Pursuant to its interpretation of the “free use” clauses in its 
leases, Petro-Hunt used residue gas processed at the Little Knife Gas Plant 
as fuel for operating the central tank batteries.11 
Regardless of the royalty clause in each lease, Petro-Hunt calculated 
royalty payments on the same basis for every royalty owner.12  Although 
the language was not identical, the parties agreed the royalty clauses were 
substantially similar and required royalty calculation “based on the market 
value of the gas at the well.”13  In 2001, the royalty owners filed suit against 
Petro-Hunt, claiming underpaid royalties were due because Petro-Hunt 
deducted post-production costs before calculating royalties.14  In 2007, the 
district court granted partial summary judgment for Petro-Hunt on the issue 
of royalty calculation and determined that the royalties should be calculated 
under the workback method.15  The workback method allowed deduction of 
post-production expenses before royalties were calculated.16  When dis-
covery was complete, the district court granted Petro-Hunt’s summary 
 
5. Id. 
6. Id. ¶ 3, 768 N.W.2d at 499.  By merging with Gulf Oil Corporation in 1985, Chevron 
obtained the Little Knife Gas Plant and interests in the Little Knife Field. Id.  In 1992, Chevron 
sold the plant and its interests in the field to the William Herbert Hunt Trust Estate. Id.  Five years 
later, in 1997, the estate conveyed its interests in the plant and field to Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. Id. 
7. Id. ¶¶ 8, 20, 768 N.W.2d at 500, 502. 
8. Id. ¶ 22, 768 N.W.2d at 503. 
9. Id.  Other products, including sulfur and butane, were also extracted. Id. 
10. Id. ¶¶ 2, 22, 768 N.W.2d at 498, 503.  “Tailgate” is defined as: “[t]he delivery point for 
residue gas after processing and removal of liquid constituents in a processing plant.”  HOWARD 
R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 1037 (13th ed. 2006). 
11. Bice, ¶ 22, 768 N.W.2d at 503.  Each lease in question contained a “free use” clause. Id. 
12. Id. ¶ 4, 768 N.W.2d at 499. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. ¶ 5.  The royalty owners were granted class certification in 2004. Id.  The class 
included “[a]ll persons who own, or have owned, any minerals and/or royalty interests or 
overriding royalty interests located within the Little Knife Field of Dunn, Billings and McKenzie 
Counties of North Dakota from which gas was processed at the Little Knife Gas Plant.” Id. 
15. Id. ¶ 6.  The Honorable Zane Anderson of the Billings County District Court Southwest 
Judicial District partially granted Petro-Hunt’s motion for summary judgment on April 30, 2007.  
Brief of Appellees at 1, 10, Bice, 2009 ND 124, 768 N.W.2d 496 (No. 20080265). 
16. Bice, ¶ 6, 768 N.W.2d at 499. 
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judgment motion on the remaining issues, which related to the use of resi-
due gas at the central tank batteries and deductions for depreciation and 
risk-capital.17  The royalty owners appealed, claiming the grant of summary 
judgment for Petro-Hunt was erroneous as a matter of law.18 
On appeal, the royalty owners raised three issues.19  First, the royalty 
owners asserted the district court erred in deciding post-production costs 
could be deducted before calculating royalties.20  The royalty owners 
argued the North Dakota Supreme Court should reject the “at the well” rule, 
which allowed Petro-Hunt to deduct post-production costs before royalty 
calculation.21  Instead, the royalty owners asked the North Dakota Supreme 
Court to adopt the first marketable product doctrine, under which Petro-
Hunt could not deduct post-production costs before calculating royalties.22  
Second, the royalty owners claimed the district court erred in finding the 
“free use” clauses allowed Petro-Hunt to use residue gas off the leased 
premises without paying royalty on that residue gas.23  The royalty owners 
maintained the “free use” clauses only permitted Petro-Hunt to use residue 
gas on, and not off, the leased premises without cost.24  Third, the royalty 
owners contended the district court erred when it concluded Petro-Hunt’s 
deductions for risk-capital and depreciation were not excessive.25  Affirm-
ing the district court’s summary judgment decision, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court adopted the “at the well” rule for calculating royalties on oil 
and gas leases, held the “free use” clauses authorized Petro-Hunt to use 
residue gas off the leased premises, and determined Petro-Hunt’s deduc-
tions for risk-capital and depreciation were proper.26 
 
17. Id.  The district court’s order granting Petro-Hunt’s summary judgment motion was 
issued on July 30, 2008.  Brief of Appellees, supra note 15, at 10. 
18. Bice, ¶ 7, 768 N.W.2d at 499.  Professor Owen L. Anderson argued on behalf of the 
royalty owners before the North Dakota Supreme Court. Id. (syllabus).  Professor Anderson, 
Eugene Kuntz Chair in Oil, Gas, and Natural Resources at the University of Oklahoma College of 
Law, received his Juris Doctor from, and is a former professor of, the University of North Dakota 
School of Law.  The University of Oklahoma College of Law Faculty Pages, http://www.law.ou. 
edu/faculty/anderson.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). 
19. Bice, ¶¶ 10, 22, 28, 768 N.W.2d at 500, 502, 504. 
20. Id. ¶ 10, 768 N.W.2d at 500. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. ¶ 22, 768 N.W.2d at 502. 
24. Id. ¶ 23, 768 N.W.2d at 503. 
25. Id. ¶ 28, 768 N.W.2d at 504. 
26. Id. ¶¶ 1, 21, 27, 29, 31, 33, 768 N.W.2d at 498, 502, 504-06. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Bice implicated several important concepts relating to oil and gas law.  
First, the implied duty to market is summarized to demonstrate the genesis 
of the majority and minority rules pertaining to the deductibility of post-
production expenses when calculating royalty.  Next, the development of 
the “at the well” rule is examined, and the two methods for calculating 
market value at the well under the majority rule are addressed.  Finally, the 
first marketable product doctrine is considered, including the different 
approaches that have emerged among the states following the minority rule. 
A. THE IMPLIED DUTY TO MARKET 
This discussion begins by defining several terms that frequently appear 
in oil and gas leases.  The party entitled to drill and operate wells under a 
lease is the lessee.27  The lessor, on the other hand, is the royalty owner.28  
“Production” generally refers to a process of obtaining crude oil or natural 
gas from a well.29  The actual point where gas is removed from the ground 
is known as the “wellhead.”30 
The implied duty to market has long been a part of oil and gas law.31  
Today, the major oil and gas producing states acknowledge the lessee has a 
duty to market its product, as implied in every oil and gas lease.32  How-
ever, this implied duty to market necessarily gives rise to costs, and the 
question of which costs a lessee is required to bear has been debated.33  
Often, the central issue in royalty disputes relates to “expenses incurred by 
the lessee after production passes through the wellhead . . . .”34 
As a result, two theories, one known as the “at the well” rule and the 
other as the first marketable product doctrine, have developed.35  The “at 
the well” rule and first marketable product doctrine address which party is 
responsible for expenses incurred after gas reaches the wellhead.36  While 
each approach recognizes that the lessee must bear the costs of exploration 
 
27. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 10, at 554.  Thus, Petro-Hunt was the lessee in Bice.  
See Bice, ¶ 3, 768 N.W.2d at 499. 
28. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 10, at 554. 
29. Id. at 814-15. 
30. Id. at 1143 (citing Schroeder v. Terra Energy, Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Mich. 1997)). 
31. Byron C. Keeling & Karolyn King Gillespie, The First Marketable Product Doctrine:  
Just What is the “Product”?, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 20 (2005). 
32. Edward B. Poitevent, II, Post-Production Deductions from Royalty, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 
709, 713 (2003). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 713, 716-17. 
36. Id. at 713. 
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and production, the theories diverge concerning the point at which 
production ends.37 
B. THE “AT THE WELL” RULE 
The majority of states follow the “at the well” rule, under which the 
“implied duty to market production does not require a lessee to bear the 
costs of marketing production alone.”38  In other words, the majority rule 
provides that costs arising after the gas reaches the wellhead may be shared 
between the lessee and lessor.39  The three major oil and gas producing 
states, Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, follow the “at the well” rule.40  
Under the case law of these three states, the “at the well” rule generally 
provides that the appropriate point for royalty calculation is the wellhead, 
where the oil or gas is captured from the ground and converted into 
property.41  Accordingly, the majority rule provides that post-production 
expenses, such as dehydration and transportation costs, may be deducted 
before royalty is calculated.42 
Wall v. United Gas Public Service Co.,43 a 1943 Louisiana Supreme 
Court decision, is an early case in the development of the “at the well” 
rule.44  In Wall, the lease provided that royalty would be calculated on the 
“market price.”45  Because the lessee paid transportation and processing 
costs to sell the gas at a point two miles away from the gas field, the lessee 
calculated royalty based on the value of the gas at the well, rather than on 
the amount for which the gas was actually sold.46  The royalty owner 
argued, however, that the royalty should have been calculated based on the 
 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 716. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 720.  One article lists Montana, California, Kentucky, and New Mexico as states 
that adhere to the “at the well” rule.  Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 51 n.193.  Though 
written in 2005, the article also includes North Dakota among the majority rule states, based on 
the state case of Koch Oil Co. v. Hanson, 536 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 1995), and the federal decision 
of Hurinenko v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 69 F.3d 283 (8th Cir. 1995). Id.  Michigan is described as 
following the “at the well” rule for leases dated before March 29, 2000. Id.  The article also 
suggests Alabama is likely to adopt the majority rule, although no appellate court there had yet 
addressed the particular issue in a royalty context. Id. 
41. Poitevent, supra note 32, at 720. 
42. Id.  Dehydration involves removing water from the liquid produced at an oil well.  
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 10, at 247.  Transportation costs include “[t]he costs of 
transporting oil or gas to a market.” Id. at 1092. 
43. 152 So. 561 (La. 1934). 
44. Wall, 152 So. at 562. 
45. Id. at 562. 
46. Id. at 563. 
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price for which the gas was sold.47  The Wall court held in favor of the 
lessee and determined that, where the term “market price” is used for roy-
alty calculation, the wellhead is the appropriate point for determining 
royalty payments.48  Moreover, the court stated, “[T]he lessee cannot be 
taxed with the whole cost of marketing the gas and extracting therefrom the 
gasoline.”49 
In addition, the Wall court noted the trial judge, in determining whether 
the royalty paid was appropriate, had used a workback method by 
“deduct[ing] from the price received by [the lessee] the expense of piping 
the gas to the place where it was sold . . . .”50  While there was no market 
for the gas at the well, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered well prices 
from other Louisiana fields to determine whether the royalty paid by the 
lessee was adequate.51  The court stated that if such comparable sales infor-
mation had not been available, the trial judge would have been correct in 
using a workback approach.52  That is, the Wall court used a comparable 
sales method to determine the propriety of the royalty paid.53  The com-
parable sales method and the workback method remain the two systems for 
lessees to calculate market value at the well in majority rule states.54  In 
short, the Wall court allowed the lessee to deduct its transportation and 
processing costs before calculating royalty and established a preference for 
the comparable sales method—when comparable sales information is 
available—over the workback method.55 
The Wall rule was developed further in the 1960 Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision of Freeland v. Sun Oil Co.56  The main issue in Freeland 
was whether lessors are expected to “bear any part of the cost of processing 
[gas.]”57  The Fifth Circuit, interpreting Louisiana law, determined reason-
able processing costs, which are necessary for creating or adding value to 
gas, may be deducted before royalty calculation.58  The Freeland court 
further stated that when comparable sales information is not available, the 
workback method may be used to arrive at a market value of gas at the 
 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 564. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 564-65. 
52. Id. at 564. 
53. Id. at 564-65. 
54. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 31. 
55. Wall, 152 So. at 564-65. 
56. 277 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1960). 
57. Freeland, 277 F.2d at 155. 
58. Id. at 159. 
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well.59  The Fifth Circuit opined, “[I]n the analytical process of reconstruct-
ing a market value where none otherwise exists with sufficient definiteness, 
all increase in the ultimate sales value attributable to the expenses incurred 
in transporting and processing the commodity must be deducted.”60 
Another significant case in the development of the “at the well” rule is 
Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co.61  The Mississippi oil and 
gas leases at issue in Piney Woods used the phrase “market value at the 
well” for measuring royalties.62  The royalty owners contested Shell’s 
practice of deducting processing costs before calculating royalty.63  Noting 
Shell’s actions were proper, the Fifth Circuit defined “market value at the 
well” as “market value before processing and transportation . . . .”64  Thus, 
following the Fifth Circuit’s definition of the term “market value at the 
well,” production ends when gas reaches the wellhead, enabling lessees to 
deduct subsequent costs of processing, transporting, and marketing.65  With 
this holding, the Fifth Circuit implied its rejection of the contrary first mar-
ketable product doctrine.66 
In summary, the “at the well” rule defines the wellhead as the appro-
priate point for royalty calculation.67  Under the “at the well” rule, royalty 
may be calculated using the comparable sales method or the workback 
method.68  Of the two methods, the comparable sales method is the pre-
ferred method for calculating market value.69  Using the comparable sales 
method, the market value of gas at the wellhead is determined by 
“averaging the prices that the lessee and other producers are receiving, at 
the same time and in the same field, for oil or gas of comparable quality, 
quantity, and availability . . . .”70  Nonetheless, when comparable sales 
evidence is not available, it is appropriate to use the workback method.71  
Following the workback method, lessees begin with the point of sale price 
received, then deduct reasonable post-production costs to arrive at the 
 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984). 
62. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 229. 
63. Id. at 225. 
64. Id. at 231. 
65. Id. at 240. 
66. Id.; Poitevent, supra note 32, at 734 (noting the court’s implicit rejection of the minority 
rule). 
67. Poitevent, supra note 32, at 720. 
68. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 31-32. 
69. Id. at 33. 
70. Id. at 31-32. 
71. Id. at 33. 
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market value of oil or gas at the wellhead.72  Thus, oil companies realize a 
greater profit in “at the well” jurisdictions because, by deducting post-pro-
duction costs before royalty is calculated, royalty payments are reduced.73 
C. THE FIRST MARKETABLE PRODUCT DOCTRINE 
The majority of states74 today follow the “at the well” rule, which 
allows lessees to calculate royalty based on the value of production at the 
wellhead as opposed to a downstream location.75  On the other hand, a 
minority of states have adopted the view “that a lessee’s implied duty to 
market production requires a lessee to bear the full cost of any steps 
necessary to transform the gas into a marketable condition . . . .”76  In other 
words, the minority rule generally permits a lessee to deduct certain costs 
from the value of gas only after the lessee has rendered the gas market-
able.77  This minority approach is known as the first marketable product 
doctrine.78  Interestingly, the first marketable product states of Kansas, 
Oklahoma, Colorado, West Virginia, and Arkansas follow different ver-
sions of the rule.79 
Early deviations from the majority rule were apparent in 1964 with the 
Kansas Supreme Court decisions in Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co.80 and 
Schupbach v. Continental Oil Co.81  Both cases involved leases which 
required royalty payments based on “the proceeds [from] the sale [of gas] at 
the mouth of the well.”82  In each case, the lessee deducted compression 
costs before calculating the royalty owed.83  In Gilmore, the court relied on 
 
72. Id. at 32. 
73. See Poitevent, supra note 32, at 716. 
74. Although the “at the well” rule is often called the majority rule, Professor Anderson 
believes the first marketable product doctrine is the true majority rule.  See Owen L. Anderson, 
Rogers, Wellman, and the New Implied Marketplace Covenant, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND., 
Special Inst. On Private Oil and Gas Royalties, Paper 13A-1, 13A-24 n.126 (2003).  Professor 
Anderson points out the first marketable product jurisdictions include Arkansas, Colorado, 
Kansas, Nevada, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Wyoming, and the federal government. Id.  Thus, it is 
arguably reasonable to conclude the first marketable product doctrine is the majority rule. See id. 
75. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 51. 
76. Poitevent, supra note 32, at 717. 
77. Id. 
78. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 51. 
79. Id. at 79 (discussing the different minority rule approaches in Kansas, Oklahoma, 
Colorado, and West Virginia); Poitevent, supra note 32, at 744 (outlining Arkansas case law on 
the first marketable product doctrine). 
80. 388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964). 
81. 394 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1964). 
82. Schupbach, 394 P.2d at 2; Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 604. 
83. Schupbach, 394 P.2d at 4; Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 604-05.  The lessee installed one large 
compressor station on the leased premises to compress all the gas produced from the wells.  
Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 604.  A compressor station is “[a]n installation in which the pressure of gas 
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“the most recent authorities on the subject of the duty to prepare for 
market . . .” and concluded the lessee’s implied duty to market required the 
lessee to bear compression costs because those costs were “necessary to 
make the gas marketable.”84  Accordingly, in both Gilmore and Schupbach, 
the Kansas Supreme Court stated that a lessee may not deduct compression 
costs before royalty calculation.85 
In addition to compression costs, minority rule states have considered 
the deductibility of dehydration and gathering costs.86  For instance, in a 
1992 Oklahoma case, TXO Production Corp. v. State ex rel. Commissioners 
of the Land Office,87 the lessee deducted compression, dehydration, and 
gathering costs before calculating royalty.88  The Oklahoma Supreme Court 
noted the lessee’s implied duty to market obligated the lessee to bear neces-
sary expenses for obtaining a marketable product.89  Further, because the 
court determined compression, dehydration, and gathering costs were 
necessary to arrive at a marketable product, the court held the lessee’s 
deductions for those expenses were inappropriate.90  Oklahoma’s rule was 
subsequently refined in Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.91  The 
Mittelstaedt court reiterated its position from TXO Production Corp., that a 
lessee must shoulder the costs necessary to create a marketable product.92  
Yet, the court concluded that if a marketable product was already obtained, 
the lessee could properly deduct, before calculating royalty, reasonable 
post-production costs incurred to enhance the product.93 
 
is raised for transmission through pipe lines while the gas is cooled, scrubbed and dehydrated.”  
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 10, at 180. 
84. Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 607.  The Gilmore court observed, “The only purpose for the 
compressing station was to put enough force behind the gas to enable it to enter the pipeline on the 
lease.  This made the gas marketable and was in satisfaction of the duties of the lessee to do so.” 
Id. at 606. 
85. Schupbach, 394 P.2d at 5; Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 607. 
86. See, e.g., Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Okla. 1998); TXO 
Prod. Corp. v. State ex rel. Comm’rs of the Land Office, 903 P.2d 259, 260 (Okla. 1994).  See 
supra note 42 (defining dehydration).  Gathering entails “collecting gas at the point of production 
(the wellhead) and moving it to a collection point for further movement through a pipeline’s 
principal transmission system.”  WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 10, at 434 (quoting N. Natural 
Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 929 F.2d 1261, 1265 (8th Cir. 1991)). 
87. 903 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1994). 
88. TXO Prod. Corp., 903 P.2d at 260. 
89. Id. at 262. 
90. Id. 
91. 954 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998). 
92. Mittelstaedt, 954 P.2d at 1205. 
93. Id.  The Mittelstaedt court stated: 
[T]he lessor [royalty owner] must bear a proportionate share of such costs if the lessee 
can show (1) that the costs enhanced the value of an already marketable product, (2) 
that such costs are reasonable, and (3) that actual royalty revenues increased in 
proportion with the costs assessed against the nonworking interest. 
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Colorado’s rule on the deductibility of post-production costs is similar 
to Oklahoma’s approach, as evidenced by the Colorado Supreme Court’s 
decision in Garman v. Conoco, Inc.94  In Garman, the court considered 
whether an overriding royalty interest owner could be required to share in 
post-production costs.95  Relying on the implied duty to market, which the 
court determined was implied in every oil and gas lease,96 the Colorado 
Supreme Court held that the lessee alone was obligated to bear the post-
production expenses necessary to obtain a marketable product.97  However, 
the court pointed out that a lessee could deduct costs incurred to enhance 
the value of an already marketable product.98 
Various permutations of the first marketable product doctrine have 
emerged in the states following the minority rule.99  Generally, in Kansas, 
Oklahoma, and Arkansas, a lessee is responsible for all expenses, except 
transportation costs, to produce a marketable product.100  Lessees in 
Colorado and West Virginia, however, usually shoulder transportation 
costs, in addition to other expenses incurred in creating a marketable 
product.101  One author notes a chief criticism of the minority rule “is that it 
can be difficult to determine when the gas becomes ‘marketable,’ and the 
states that have adopted the marketable product rule have provided little 
guidance.”102  Because there is no defined marketability standard in the first 
 
Id. 
94. 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994). 
95. Garman, 886 P.2d at 653.  An overriding royalty is “[a]n interest in oil and gas produced 
at the surface, free of the expense of production, and in addition to the usual landowner’s royalty 
reserved to the lessor in an oil and gas lease.”  WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 10, at 727. 
96. Garman, 886 P.2d at 659 n.21. 
97. Id. at 659. 
98. Id. at 661.  Professor Anderson contends the Garman court adopted the correct rule.  See 
generally Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation:  Should Overriding Royalty Interests and 
Nonparticipating Royalty Interests, Whether Payable in Value or in Kind, Be Subject to the Same 
Valuation Standard as Lease Royalty?, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 20 (2000).  In support of 
this viewpoint, Professor Anderson has opined, “Forcing a royalty owner to accept an 
unmarketable product would convert the royalty owner’s interest into a cost-bearing interest in 
that the royalty owner would have to do something tangible to the product to make it marketable 
and, in so doing, duplicate the similar facilities of the operator.” Id. 
99. Compare Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 79-80 (summarizing the rules in Kansas, 
Oklahoma, Colorado, and West Virginia), with Poitevent, supra note 32, at 735-50 (discussing 
relevant case law in Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Colorado). 
100. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 79-80; Poitevent, supra note 32, at 744. 
101. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 80.  Professor Anderson notes an arguable 
difference exists between the Colorado and West Virginia positions.  See generally Anderson, 
supra note 74, at 13A-22 to -23.  While Colorado does not allow deductions until after the product 
is first marketable, West Virginia does not allow a lessee to take any deductions before the first 
arm’s-length transaction, even if the product is already marketable at the point of the first arm’s-
length transaction.  See generally id. 
102. Brian S. Wheeler, Deducting Post-Production Costs when Calculating Royalty:  What 
Does the Lease Provide?, 8 APPALACHIAN J. L. 1, 10 (2008). 
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marketable product doctrine, lessees in minority rule jurisdictions are un-
able to predict with certainty which post-production cost deductions courts 
will allow.103  Moreover, critics of the first marketable product doctrine 
have stated the approach “improperly uses the [implied duty to market] to 
reach a result different from that which the parties contemplated in the 
express terms of their lease agreement.”104  Lessors, however, have a very 
practical reason for favoring the first marketable product doctrine: when 
lessees are unable to deduct post-production expenses before calculating 
royalty, lessors enjoy higher royalty payments.105 
III. ANALYSIS 
Justice Crothers authored the opinion in Bice, in which Chief Justice 
VandeWalle, Justice Maring, Justice Kapsner, and Justice Sandstrom 
joined.106  The court adopted the “at the well” rule in North Dakota for 
royalty calculation on oil and gas leases and thus determined Petro-Hunt 
acted properly in deducting post-production costs from proceeds before cal-
culating royalty.107  Additionally, the court held the “free use” clauses 
allowed Petro-Hunt to use residue gas off the leased premises to fuel the 
central tank batteries because the residue gas was used in furtherance of 
lease operations.108  Finally, the court determined Petro-Hunt’s deductions 
for risk-capital and depreciation were not excessive.109  Therefore, the court 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Petro-Hunt.110 
A. NORTH DAKOTA FOLLOWS THE “AT THE WELL” RULE 
The first issue presented in Bice was whether the district court erred in 
concluding royalties could be calculated after the deduction of post-
production costs.111  The North Dakota Supreme Court was asked to deter-
mine whether North Dakota followed the “at the well” rule or the first 
marketable product doctrine for calculating royalties on oil and gas 
leases.112  Before deciding the issue, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
examined both the majority “at the well” rule and the minority first 
 
103. Poitevent, supra note 32, at 759. 
104. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 116-17. 
105. See Anderson, supra note 98, at 20. 
106. Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶¶ 1, 36, 768 N.W.2d 496, 498, 506. 
107. Id. ¶ 21, 768 N.W.2d at 502. 
108. Id. ¶ 27, 768 N.W.2d at 504. 
109. Id. ¶¶ 29, 31, 33-34, 768 N.W.2d at 504-06. 
110. Id. ¶ 27, 768 N.W.2d at 504. 
111. Id. ¶ 10, 768 N.W.2d at 500. 
112. Id. 
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marketable product doctrine.113  After a thorough discussion of each rule, 
the court analyzed pertinent case law in North Dakota and the Eighth 
Circuit.114  Finally, the court ruled on the issue of whether Petro-Hunt could 
deduct post-production costs before calculating royalty.115 
1. Majority and Minority Rules 
The Bice court first considered the unresolved nature of the law 
regarding interpretation of the phrase “market value at the well.”116  The 
majority of states follow the “at the well” rule, under which “‘any costs 
incurred by the lessee after the [gas] reaches the wellhead . . . may be’ 
deducted before the royalty is calculated.”117  States following the majority 
rule permitted lessees to use one of two methods for calculating the market 
value of gas or oil at the well.118  The first method, known as the com-
parable sales method, enabled the lessee to average prices received by the 
lessee and other producers for oil or gas of similar quality, quantity, and 
availability to determine the market value of gas at the wellhead.119  The 
second method, commonly called the work-back method, allowed a lessee 
to determine the market value of gas at the well by deducting reasonable 
post-production costs from the price received at a point of sale.120  While 
most courts preferred the comparable sales method, the method could not 
be used if evidence of comparable sales did not exist.121  The court then 
considered which states followed the “at the well” rule:  Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Texas, the three major oil and gas producing states, in 
addition to California, Kentucky, Montana, and New Mexico.122 
In contrast, Arkansas, Colorado, Oklahoma, Kansas, and West Virginia 
adopted the minority rule, known as the first marketable product rule.123  
Under the minority rule, the lessee paid costs incurred in producing a mar-
ketable product, after which point additional costs to enhance the market-
ability of the gas were shared between the lessee and lessor.124  The primary 
 
113. Id. ¶¶ 13-17, 768 N.W.2d at 500-02. 
114. Id. ¶¶ 17-20, 768 N.W.2d at 502. 
115. Id. ¶ 21. 
116. Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 500. 
117. Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 501 (quoting Poitevent, supra note 32, at 716 and Wheeler, 
supra note 102, at 7). 
118. Id. ¶ 14. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. ¶ 15. 
123. Id. ¶ 16. 
124. Id. 
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problem with the first marketable product rule was the difficulty in ascer-
taining when the gas became a marketable product.125  Noting this problem, 
the Bice court observed that even the minority rule states had not set forth a 
clear standard for establishing when a marketable product was produced.126  
After analyzing both the majority and minority rules, the court turned its 
attention to controlling and persuasive case law.127 
2. Relevant Case Law 
Before Bice, North Dakota had not explicitly defined how to calculate 
royalty based on “market value at the well.”128  Nonetheless, two North 
Dakota cases were considered.129  Amerada Hess Corp. v. Conrad130 and 
Koch Oil Co. v. Hanson131 addressed the issue of how to value oil and gas 
for purposes of tax assessment.  Both decisions announced that the fair 
market value of oil and gas could be calculated by deducting processing 
costs from gross sales revenues under the workback method.132 
The North Dakota Supreme Court next turned its attention to 
Hurinenko v. Chevron, USA, Inc.,133 an Eighth Circuit decision interpreting 
North Dakota law.134  Hurinenko involved a dispute between royalty 
owners and a lessee, where the royalty owners claimed the lessee could not 
deduct processing costs before calculating royalties.135  The Eighth Circuit 
determined that North Dakota law allowed market value at the well to be 
calculated by subtracting processing costs from gross sales revenues.136  
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit deemed the workback method especially 
appropriate in Hurinenko because “[t]he gas had no readily discernible 
market value at the well before the incursion of processing costs to separate 
the compounds.”137  While the Bice court noted that federal district court 
decisions were not binding upon North Dakota courts, such decisions would 
be respected if they were persuasive and based on sound reasoning.138 
 
125. Id. ¶ 17, 768 N.W.2d at 502. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. 
128. Id. ¶ 18. 
129. Id. 
130. 410 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1987). 
131. 536 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 1995). 
132. Bice, ¶ 18, 768 N.W.2d at 502. 
133. 69 F.3d 283 (8th Cir. 1995). 
134. Hurinenko, 69 F.3d at 285. 
135. Id. at 284-85. 
136. Id. at 285. 
137. Id. 
138. Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 19, 768 N.W.2d 496, 502. 
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The facts of Hurinenko were similar to the facts of Bice, and the court 
determined the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of market value at the well 
was persuasive.139  The Little Knife Field, like the field in Hurinenko, 
yielded sour gas with no discernible market value at the well.140  Yet, the 
Bice leases stated royalty was to be calculated based on the market value of 
gas at the well.141  Petro-Hunt could not use the comparable sales method to 
determine the market value of gas at the well because no comparable sales 
data existed under the facts in the case.142  Therefore, Petro-Hunt’s only 
option for arriving at a market value for gas at the well was the workback 
method.143  The North Dakota Supreme Court then expressly announced it 
joined the majority of states following the “at the well” rule.  Thus, the 
district court properly found Petro-Hunt could deduct post-production costs 
before calculating royalty.144 
B. “FREE USE” CLAUSES ALLOW RESIDUE GAS USE  
OFF THE LEASED PREMISES 
The second issue in Bice was whether the district court erred in deter-
mining Petro-Hunt could use residue gas off the leased premises without 
paying royalty on that gas, so long as the gas was used to carry out lease 
operations.145  In reaching its decision, the court began by considering the 
language of the “free use” clauses.146  Then, the court noted each party’s 
interpretation of the clauses.147 
First, the leases in question all contained a “free use” clause stating 
“either the lessees ‘shall have the right to use, free of cost, gas, oil and 
water produced on said land for its operation thereon’ or the lessees ‘shall 
have free use of oil, gas and water from said land . . . for all its operations 
hereunder.’”148  Petro-Hunt used residue gas processed at the Little Knife 
 
139. Id. ¶ 20, 768 N.W.2d at 502. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id.  The court stated: 
Since the contracted for royalty is based on the market value of the gas at the well and 
the gas has no market value at the well, the only way to determine the market value of 
the gas at the well is to work back from where a market value exists, meaning using 
the work-back method, by deducting post-production costs from the plant tailgate 
proceeds. 
Id. 
144. Id. ¶ 21. 
145. Id. ¶ 22. 
146. Id. ¶¶ 26-27, 768 N.W.2d at 503-04. 
147. Id. ¶ 23, 768 N.W.2d at 503. 
148. Id. ¶ 22. 
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Gas Plant to fuel its central tank batteries.149  At the central tank batteries, 
oil, gas, and water were treated and divided into separate streams.150  Be-
cause the residue gas was used to render marketable gas, Petro-Hunt argued 
it was entitled to use the residue gas off of the leased premises without pay-
ing royalty on the residue gas under the “free use” clauses.151  The royalty 
owners countered that because the residue gas was being used off of the 
leased premises, Petro-Hunt owed royalties on the gas used to fuel the 
central tank batteries.152  That is, the royalty owners interpreted the “free 
use” clauses to mean Petro-Hunt could only use residue gas free of cost if 
the residue gas was used on, and not off, the leased premises.153 
The Bice court noted the issue of “[w]hether residue gas can be used 
off of the leased premises, but in furtherance of the lease operations without 
paying royalty on that gas under a ‘free use’ clause is an issue of first 
impression.”154  The record indicated that functions normally performed at 
each well site were performed instead at Petro-Hunt’s central tank bat-
teries.155  Petro-Hunt consolidated its facilities into three central tank 
batteries rather than maintaining a battery at each individual well.156  Both 
parties benefitted from the efficiency of the central tank batteries, which 
resulted in less overall use of gas, a minimum of surface disturbance, and 
the recovery of hydrocarbons on which the lessors received royalties.157 
The North Dakota Supreme Court next commented that the royalty 
owners’ interpretation of the “free use” clauses could lead to an absurd 
result.158  For instance, if use of residue gas was allowed only on, and not 
off, the leased premises, those royalty owners with a gas producer’s central 
tank battery on their property would bear the entire burden of the “free use” 
clauses, despite other royalty owners also benefiting from the central tank 
battery.159  Because the record demonstrated the residue gas was used to 
further the lease operations, the court held the district court properly deter-
mined Petro-Hunt could use residue gas off the leased premises without 
paying royalty on that gas.160 
 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. ¶ 23. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. ¶ 26. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. ¶ 27, 768 N.W.2d at 504. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
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C. DEDUCTIONS FOR RISK-CAPITAL AND DEPRECIATION 
WERE NOT EXCESSIVE 
The third and final issue in Bice was whether the district court erred in 
finding Petro-Hunt’s deductions for risk-capital and depreciation were not 
excessive.161  To begin its analysis, the court considered the royalty owners’ 
claim that, because the Little Knife Gas Plant made a profit every year, no 
risk existed and therefore a risk-capital charge by Petro-Hunt was not justi-
fied.162  Next, the court examined the royalty owners’ contention that Petro-
Hunt’s depreciation deduction was excessive.163 
1. Risk-Capital 
To approach the final issue in Bice, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
first analyzed whether the district court properly found Petro-Hunt’s risk-
capital charges were commercially reasonable.164  In support of its claim 
that Petro-Hunt’s risk-capital deduction was excessive, the royalty owners 
argued that no risk existed because the Little Knife Gas Plant realized a 
profit every year.165  Petro-Hunt countered that the 1983 settlement agree-
ment explicitly stated risk-capital deductions could be taken.166 
The Bice court then focused on the 1983 settlement agreement to 
examine the propriety of Petro-Hunt’s risk-capital deductions.167  The 1983 
settlement agreement stated, “the cost of risk-capital shall be six percent on 
the undepreciated investment in the Little Knife Gas Plant.”168  After 
determining Petro-Hunt’s risk-capital charges were calculated according to 
the 1983 settlement agreement, the court commented, “the [royalty owners] 
fail[ed] to explain why the parties to the 1983 settlement agreement are no 
longer bound by that agreement.”169  In addition, the royalty owners had not 
demonstrated why a six percent risk-capital charge was excessive.170  As 
the party resisting summary judgment, the royalty owners were required to 
present competent, admissible evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of 
 
161. Id. ¶ 28. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. ¶ 30, 768 N.W.2d at 505. 
164. Id. ¶ 28, 768 N.W.2d at 504. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. ¶ 29. 
168. Id. 
169. Id.  The royalty owners who signed the 1983 agreement had claimed they were no 
longer bound by that agreement because, according to the royalty owners, Petro-Hunt breached 
the terms of the 1983 settlement agreement.  Brief of Appellants at 13, Bice, 2009 ND 124, 768 
N.W.2d 496 (No. 20080265). 
170. Bice, ¶ 29, 768 N.W.2d at 504. 
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material fact.171  Because the royalty owners failed to produce such evi-
dence, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined Petro-Hunt’s risk-
capital charges were commercially reasonable and allowable as a deduction 
from sales proceeds before calculating royalty.172  Thus, the district court’s 
grant of Petro-Hunt’s summary judgment motion regarding the risk-capital 
charge was proper.173 
2. Depreciation 
Next, the court considered the claim that Petro-Hunt’s depreciation 
deductions were excessive.174  The royalty owners offered three reasons in 
support of their stance.175  First, the royalty owners argued the 1983 settle-
ment agreement disallowed a depreciation charge after July 22, 1990.176  
Second, the royalty owners claimed Petro-Hunt depreciated the Little Knife 
Gas Plant below its salvage value.177  Third, the royalty owners alleged the 
fair market value of the plant exceeded the undepreciated amount.178 
a. The 1983 Settlement Agreement 
The royalty owners contended the 1983 settlement agreement pro-
hibited Petro-Hunt from charging depreciation after July 22, 1990.179  
Petro-Hunt asserted its practice of charging depreciation after 1990 was 
proper because the 1983 settlement agreement did not require all deprecia-
tion to occur before July 22, 1990.180  In response to these arguments, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court looked to the language of the 1983 settlement 
agreement.181  Because the 1983 settlement agreement incorporated by 
 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 504-05. 
174. Id. ¶ 30, 768 N.W.2d at 505. 
175. Id. ¶¶ 30, 32-34, 768 N.W.2d at 505-06. 
176. Id. ¶ 30, 768 N.W.2d at 505. 
177. Id. ¶ 32. 
178. Id. ¶ 34, 768 N.W.2d at 506. 
179. Id. ¶ 30, 768 N.W.2d at 505. 
180. Id. 
181. Id.  A relevant excerpt of the 1983 settlement agreement follows: 
Depreciation on a 13 year straight line method shall be allowed . . . .  If at the end of 
thirteen (13) years from plant start-up (July 22, 1990), or when only 10% of the 
processed gas is being delivered from Little Knife Field, whichever is earlier, 
casinghead gas produced from the Little Knife Field is still being processed at the 
Little Knife Plant, the fair market value of the plant facilities shall be compared to the 
book value . . . contained in the agreement with the Tax Commissioner and if the fair 
market value at said time is greater, royalty shall be paid to the then owners on the 
difference. 
Id. ¶ 31. 
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reference an agreement with the Tax Commissioner, the court reviewed the 
Tax Commissioner agreement as well.182 
After analyzing both the 1983 settlement agreement and the Tax Com-
missioner agreement, the court determined the plain language of neither 
agreement barred Petro-Hunt from charging depreciation after July 22, 
1990.183  Petro-Hunt annually reviewed the Little Knife Gas Plant’s eco-
nomic status, in accordance with the Tax Commissioner agreement.184  In 
sum, the court concluded Petro-Hunt followed the practices described in the 
agreements in question and therefore depreciation charges were not pro-
hibited after July 22, 1990.185 
b. Salvage Value 
The royalty owners next argued that Petro-Hunt’s depreciation charges 
were excessive because the Little Knife Gas Plant was depreciated below its 
salvage value.186  Petro-Hunt, on the other hand, contended $656,818 
remained to be depreciated before the plant was depreciated below salvage 
value.187  The purchase price of the Little Knife Gas Plant was 
$6,213,452.188  Although the royalty owners claimed the plant could not be 
depreciated below its salvage value of $3,341,357, the royalty owners had 
failed to consider the “purchase price was net of salvage value because the 
salvage value had already been deducted from [Petro-Hunt’s] purchase 
price.”189  Furthermore, the royalty owners overlooked Petro-Hunt’s depre-
ciable capital investments in the plant, totaling $2,128,352.190  Therefore, 
the court determined Petro-Hunt could properly depreciate $8,341,804, the 
sum of the $6,213,452 purchase price and $2,128,352 capital invest-
ments.191  Petro-Hunt had only depreciated $7,684,986, and $656,818 thus 
 
182. Id.  The Tax Commissioner agreement referred to in the 1983 settlement agreement 
stated: 
Actual depreciation charges will be based on a schedule using the straight line method 
over an assumed plant life of 13 years.  This 13-year plant life will be subject to 
review each fiscal year to determine if anything significant has occurred that would 
warrant a change in the estimated economic life of the plant.  If such a change is found 
to be warranted, the remaining depreciation will be adjusted appropriately. 
Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. ¶ 32. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. ¶ 33, 768 N.W.2d at 505-06. 
189. Id. ¶ 33, 768 N.W.2d at 506. 
190. Id. Petro-Hunt made new capital investments to the Little Knife Gas Plant of 
$2,282,415, of which $2,128,352 could be depreciated.  Id. 
191. Id. 
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remained for depreciation.192  Because the royalty owners did not dispute 
these figures, the royalty owners had not demonstrated a genuine issue of 
material fact existed regarding whether the plant was depreciated below 
salvage value.193  As a result, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court’s finding that Petro-Hunt did not depreciate the Little Knife 
Gas Plant below its salvage value.194 
c. Fair Market Value 
Finally, the royalty owners asserted Petro-Hunt should not have been 
allowed to depreciate the Little Knife Gas Plant because the fair market 
value of the plant was in excess of the undepreciated amount.195  This claim 
was based on a provision within the 1983 settlement agreement.196  Conse-
quently, the royalty owners argued, Petro-Hunt had improperly calculated 
royalty.197  Petro-Hunt countered that the royalty owners had not offered 
evidence to prove the plant’s fair market value was above its undepreciated 
value.198  The district court granted Petro-Hunt’s motion for summary judg-
ment on the matter, finding the royalty owners neglected to provide “any 
competent admissible evidence” in support of their claim.199  In reviewing 
the district court proceedings, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated com-
petent, admissible evidence must be presented by a party opposing sum-
mary judgment, and the evidence must show a genuine issue of material 
fact is in dispute.200  The royalty owners, in failing to offer evidence that the 
fair market value of the plant was greater than the undepreciated amount, 
had not met their burden to resist summary judgment.201  Thus, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment for Petro-Hunt.202 
IV. IMPACT 
With the “at the well” rule in place, parties to North Dakota oil and gas 
lease agreements can feel confident their intentions at lease formation will 
 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. ¶ 34. 
196. Id.  See supra note 181 (providing the relevant excerpt of the 1983 settlement 
agreement). 
197. Brief of Appellants, supra note 169, at 7. 
198. Bice, ¶ 34, 768 N.W.2d at 506. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
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be enforced.203  In addition, the adoption of the majority rule brings stability 
to an unsettled area of law in North Dakota.204  By rejecting the minority 
rule, many problems and inconsistencies associated with the rule will be 
avoided.205  Further, the “at the well” rule will likely prevent litigation, 
thereby conserving resources for both parties and courts.206  Finally, while 
Bice ultimately benefits oil companies, royalty owners are still protected 
from lessee abuses under North Dakota law. 
A. LEASE FORMATION INTENTIONS ENFORCED 
As a general rule in North Dakota, a contract must be construed ac-
cording to the parties’ mutual intentions at the time of contract formation.207  
Some critics of the first marketable product doctrine note inconsistencies 
within the minority rule can render it “a poorly disguised device to rewrite 
oil and gas leases in a way that permits royalty owners to participate in 
downstream activities for which they have shared none of the risks and 
assumed none of the costs.”208  Moreover, another critic of the first market-
able product doctrine states, “Under the [first marketable product doctrine], 
a lessor’s royalty is not based upon the value of the gas when the lease is 
signed . . . but the value of the gas after it has been enhanced exclusively by 
the lessee.”209  By adopting the “at the well” rule, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court acted in accordance with the state’s settled law of contract 
interpretation, requiring a contract to be interpreted according to the parties’ 
intentions at the formation of the contract.210  As a result, parties to North 
Dakota oil and gas leases can feel confident their original intentions will be 
honored should a lease dispute arise and proceed to litigation.211 
 
203. Contra Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 116-17. 
204. Bice, ¶¶ 18, 21, 768 N.W.2d at 502. 
205. Cf. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 81 (listing flaws in the first marketable 
product doctrine); Poitevent, supra note 32, at 759 (discussing major criticisms of the minority 
rule); Wheeler, supra note 102, at 24 (covering problems with the first marketable product 
doctrine). 
206. Contra Wheeler, supra note 102, at 1, 25 (noting minority rule states lack a clear 
standard on the issue of which costs may be deducted before royalty calculation, frequently 
resulting in litigation). 
207. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-03 (2008). 
208. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 104. 
209. Wheeler, supra note 102, at 26. 
210. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-03 (2008). 
211. Contra Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 104 (asserting the first marketable 
product doctrine could improperly be used to rewrite oil and gas leases). 
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B. LITIGATION AVOIDANCE 
In Bice, the court discussed the unsettled nature of the law as to 
interpretation of the phrase “market value at the well.”212  When consider-
ing the first marketable product doctrine, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
observed a problem with the minority approach as a lack of consistency 
relating to the point at which a marketable product is created.213  The 
ultimate effect of the first marketable product doctrine is “uncertainty, both 
to lessees in calculating their royalty payments and to the courts in resolv-
ing royalty disputes.”214  Without a uniform approach to royalty valuation, 
the issue must be determined on an individual basis, resulting in case law 
that offers little direction to parties confronting a royalty dispute.215  
Because of the conflicting doctrines used throughout the states to calculate 
royalty, one author believes “[t]he end result will serve only to make 
domestic exploration and production even less competitive in the world 
marketplace.”216 
In contrast, by adopting the “at the well” rule, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court announced a clear standard for royalty calculation.217  Par-
ties can now be certain North Dakota courts will not consider “market value 
at the well” an ambiguous term.218  Further, the Bice court stated the 
appropriate method for determining the market value of gas at the well was 
the workback method, whereby the lessee may deduct post-production costs 
from proceeds.219  Because a large amount of litigation in the field of oil 
and gas law has focused on the issue of which costs may be deducted before 
royalty calculation, it is reasonable to assume the court’s acceptance of the 
“at the well” rule will work to prevent some litigation in North Dakota. 220  
By avoiding litigation, courts and parties conserve resources.221  Domestic 
exploration and production could increase as lessees will be able to remove 
their focus from litigation and concentrate on competing in the oil and gas 
 
212. Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d 496, 500. 
213. Id. ¶ 17, 768 N.W.2d at 502. 
214. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 82. 
215. Anderson, supra note 98, at 20-21. 
216. Id. at 21. 
217. Bice, ¶ 21, 768 N.W.2d at 502. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. ¶ 20. 
220. Contra Wheeler, supra note 102, at 1 (stating a great amount of litigation has arisen on 
the issue of which costs may be deducted before royalty calculation). 
221. Contra id. at 25 (noting lessees in first marketable product jurisdictions do not have a 
clear standard for deducting costs and, as a result, may face “an endless wave of expensive, 
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industry.222  Should a dispute proceed to trial, however, the “at the well” 
rule provides greater certainty in predicting an outcome.223  By implement-
ing the “at the well” rule and approving the workback method, the court 
resolved a conflicted area of the law, thus providing guidance to lessees, 
lessors, and North Dakota courts faced with royalty calculation disputes.224 
C. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
From a practical standpoint, lessees benefit under the “at the well” rule 
because they do not bear post-production expenses alone, but rather share 
these costs with the lessor.225  By deducting post-production costs before 
calculating royalty, royalty payments are decreased, and lessees realize 
greater profits.226  In the competitive oil and gas industry, it is understand-
able why lessees would want to take every deduction available to boost 
their bottom lines.227  Yet, one critic believes the workback method pro-
vides “the lessee . . . an incentive to overstate post-production costs in order 
to minimize its royalty-payment obligations.”228  However, North Dakota 
law currently requires lessees to provide lessors with “an information 
statement that will allow the royalty owner to clearly identify the amount of 
oil or gas sold and the amount and purpose of each deduction made from 
the gross amount due.”229  Thus, should lessees try to deduct unreasonable 
costs, lessors will have notice and can take action.230 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Bice, the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted the “at the well” rule 
for calculating royalties on oil and gas leases.231  Under the “at the well” 
rule, lessees are allowed to deduct post-production expenses before royalty 
is calculated.232  In addition, the court determined lessees may use residue 
 
222. See Anderson, supra note 98, at 20-21. 
223. See Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 82 (stating the “net effect of the [first 
marketable product] doctrine is uncertainty, both to lessees in calculating their royalty payments 
and to the courts in resolving royalty disputes”). 
224. Bice, ¶ 21, 768 N.W.2d at 502. 
225. Poitevent, supra note 32, at 716. 
226. See Owen L. Anderson, Calculating Royalty:  “Costs” Subsequent to Production—
“Figures Don’t Lie, But . . . .”, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 591, 601-02 (1994). 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 597. 
229. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-06.3 (2008). 
230. See id.  See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-39.1 to -39.3 (2008) (describing obligations 
arising with royalty payments); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-06-01, -03 to -04 (2008) (addressing 
royalty record requirements). 
231. Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 21, 768 N.W.2d 496, 502. 
232. Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 501. 
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gas off the leased premises in furtherance of lease operations without 
paying royalty on that gas under “free use” clauses.233  Finally, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court concluded the lessee’s deductions for risk-capital 
and depreciation were not excessive.234  The Bice decision brings stability 
to an unsettled area of North Dakota law, and the rule is likely to impact 
future oil and gas lease dealings in the state.235 
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